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Many more to come? Migration from and within Africa
This paper analyses past and present migration patterns from and within Africa and the main drivers explaining 
African migration flows. It then looks at individual characteristics of Africans who prepare for a move abroad. 
Finally, it develops three scenarios to forecast how many Africans might leave their home countries in the 
decades to come.
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MANY MORE TO COME? 
MIGRATION FROM AND WITHIN AFRICA
Are the forces 
that drive Africans 
to migrate across international borders 
the same as those 
that drove poor Europeans 
to seek a better life 
in the New World a century ago? 
Are these forces likely to intensify 
or weaken in the future?
“
“
- Hatton and Williamson, 2003 - 
5Overview
This paper analyses past and present migration 
patterns from and within Africa and the main drivers 
and characteristics explaining African migration flows. 
On this basis, it develops three scenarios to forecast 
how many Africans might leave their home countries in 
the decades to come.
The main findings are:
• African migration has so far grown in line with 
overall population growth.  
• More than one in two African migrants moved to 
another African country, while the other moved 
mostly to Europe, Western Asia or North America.
• A number of distinct migration patterns can be 
identified: 
• From Maghreb to Europe (mostly family reunion); 
• From Egypt to the Gulf States (mostly 
temporary workers); 
• From Eastern Africa to the Gulf States (mostly 
temporary workers) and to neighbouring 
countries (mostly refugees); 
• From Western Africa to neighbouring countries 
(mostly temporary workers and long-term 
labour migrants) and to Europe (mostly family 
reunion and irregular migrants); 
• From Central Africa to neighbouring countries 
(for temporary work and refuge); 
• From Southern Africa to neighbouring countries 
(temporary workers and long-tern labour 
migrants) and to overseas destinations (mostly 
permanent migrants).
• The number of African immigrants settling legally 
in EU Member States has dropped significantly in 
the past decade. In counterpart, irregular migration 
flows across the Mediterranean have increased.
• Available data do not suggest an imminent 
mass exodus of Africans. However, our scenarios 
make it clear that socio-economic development, 
demographic shifts and climate change are likely to 
increase the number of African migrants. Even at an 
accelerated speed of socio-economic development, 
African countries will experience more emigration 
than immigration during the next 30-40 years. 
Development will reduce population growth, but 
it will also increase the ability of young people to 
migrate.
• Climate change and its potentially destabilising 
effects will accelerate future migration within 
Africa and eventually also to neighbouring parts of 
the world.
• It is not possible to predict the extent to which 
gradually increasing or additional migratory flows 
will take place mostly within Africa or to Africa’s 
geopolitical neighbourhood – Europe, the Middle 
East and the Gulf States. This will not only depend 
on future migration pressures, but also on migration 
policies of receiving countries.
In sending countries, migration pressure will depend 
much on policy decisions in three key areas. Investing 
in a serious manner in education, especially of younger 
women, will slow down population growth. Boosting 
job creation, as well as reinforcing efforts aimed at 
reducing climate change will help to structurally reduce 
pressures on people to leave their homes. At the same 
time though, as GDP per capita increases, so does the 
ability of people to migrate.

7Links between Africa and Europe are determined 
both by geographic proximity and by cultural, social, 
economic, post-colonial and migratory ties. Between 
the 16th and the 18th centuries, several European 
nations1  established civilian and military outposts2 in 
Africa to facilitate commodity and slave trade3 as part 
of the emerging Atlantic economy, with links to the 
already established Arab and Ottoman trade systems. 
Until 1800, European presence in Africa was limited 
to a handful of traders, adventurers and pioneers. 
Turkey was the only European country with an extended 
colonial presence on the continent. 
It was only during the 19th and early 20th centuries 
that western and southern European nations4 
really expanded into Africa, sending civil servants, 
soldiers and colonial settlers, as they integrated most 
parts of Africa into their colonial empires.5 Large 
numbers of Europeans settled in Northern Africa, 
namely in Algeria,6 as well as in Southern Africa7 and to 
a smaller extent in Eastern Africa. Until World War I 
Europe was the main global source of large-scale 
emigration. Europeans were not alone – the British 
colonial administration facilitated the recruitment of 
Indian labour through agricultural producers and mining 
companies in eastern and southern Africa,8 leading to 
the emergence of politically and economically dominant 
minority populations of both European and South Asian 
descent in some parts of Africa.9
During the 20th century, the direction of flows 
changed dramatically. Immigration to Europe took 
off in earnest in the early part of the century when 
France started to recruit labour and draft soldiers in 
northern Africa, in particular from Algeria.10 Then, as 
African nations gained independence in the second half 
of the 20th century, European civil servants and 
soldiers moved back to their countries of origin, 
accompanied by considerable numbers of African-
born descendants of colonial settlers. 
In 1962, some one million native-born people of – mainly 
French and southern – European origins were driven 
out of Algeria en masse11 when the country became 
independent. The secession from France also resulted 
in Algeria pulling out of the European Communities.12 
The last big wave of post-imperial return comprised 
at least half a million colonial settlers of Portuguese 
ascent moving to the ‘motherland’ in 1974-1975.13 
Other minorities emigrated, including many people of 
Indian origin who were discriminated against after the 
independence in Eastern Africa. Similarly, members 
of the centuries-old Jewish communities of Egypt, 
Libya and the Maghreb emigrated as a consequence 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, moving both to Israel and 
to European countries.14 In the 1970s Israel organised 
the emigration of Jewish Falashas and Yemenite 
communities from Ethiopia.15
Aside from these return flows, post-colonial 
migration patterns also included an increasing 
number of Africans migrating to Europe as 
workers, students or dependent family members. 
Indeed, even after gaining independence most countries 
in northern and Sub-Saharan Africa remained oriented 
towards the former colonial powers as a result of 
established economic relations, but also cultural and 
linguistic ties. In 1960, an estimated 1.3 million African-
born people were residents of one of today’s 28 EU 
Member States.16 
European countries attracted (and still continue to 
attract) considerable numbers of African students, many 
of whom did not return to their home countries after 
finishing their studies, but remained in Europe or moved 
on to Australia, Canada or the United States. As of the 
1950s, migrants from Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa 
were also often recruited as skilled or unskilled 
labour, by Western European destination countries and 
industries based on bilateral agreements or individual 
employment contracts. Such labour recruitment 
agreements17 were concluded with Algeria,18 Morocco19 
and Tunisia.20 However, this recruitment ended quite 
abruptly in 1972-1974 with the first oil price shock, 
as a consequence of which many migrant workers 
returned to their countries of origin. Nonetheless, those 
who remained were later followed by their spouses and 
children on the basis of laws enabling family reunion. 
From Europeans in Africa to Africans in Europe
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9Since the early 1960s, the absolute number of 
Africans living outside their country of birth has 
increased fourfold – from 8.1 million to almost 36.3 
million in 2017.21 
However, this growth is in fact more or less in line 
with overall population growth on the continent. 
As a result, the share of Africans living abroad compared 
to total African population actually remained pretty 
stable over the period, fluctuating between 2.6% and 
3.2%, and standing at just 2.9% in 2017 (Figure 1).22
The share of North Africans living abroad did increase 
between 1960 and 1980, before dropping in the 1990s, 
and rising again between 2000 and 2017. Today 4.8% 
of North African people live outside of their 
country of birth. 
In contrast, the share of Sub-Saharan Africans living 
abroad has remained rather stable, with just 2.5% of 
them living abroad in 2017 (Figure 1) – although the 
share of the Southern African population living abroad 
is much higher, at around 6.3% of the population, 
compared to lower rates of 2.2% to 2.5% in Eastern, 
Western and Central Africa.
The share of Africans living abroad is not increasing
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Source: UN Population Division; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on 
Migration and Demography (KCMD).
FIGURE 1. AFRICANS LIVING ABROAD: THEIR SHARE IN AFRICA’S 
POPULATION IS SIMILAR TO THE 1960s
Share of Africans living outside their country of birth (stock data), 1960-
2017, as a percentage of the total population at the region of origin.
Much of the uncertainty surrounding the scale of African migration 
stems from the lack of reliable data on migration flows between African 
countries and on stocks of migrants residing in Africa.Even where data 
are available there is often a lack of time series long enough to enable 
the identification of medium to long-term trends.
Information on stocks of migrants can be accessed via two major data 
sets assembled by the World Bank23 and the UN Population Division24 
respectively. These data are either based on national population 
censuses, which in many countries are carried out only every 10 years; or 
on estimates, for countries providing very poor or no data.
Such data provide only a static picture of the number of foreign-born 
people residing in a destination country in a given year. This number 
reflects recent and past migration flows, but also a range of other factors, 
such as the intensity of return migration, or the migrants’ age at arrival 
and life expectancy in the country of destination. Hence, the stock of 
migrants cannot be used as a proxy for recent migratory flows.
Quantitative estimates of migration flows can be derived for most 
African countries from the immigration statistics collected by the EU, 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and recruiting Gulf countries of destination. This, however, covers only 
those migrants who leave Africa for overseas’ destinations in developed 
countries. In contrast, there is a stark lack of complete statistical 
information on flows within Africa.
An alternative source of information consists of estimates of net 
migration flows (immigration minus emigration) produced on the basis 
of residual demographic accounting exercises.25 Such estimates do not 
perfectly match existing statistics on immigration and emigration in 
the case of OECD countries but they nonetheless represent the most 
comprehensive data source to analyse migration from and between less 
developed countries.
BOX 1 - African migration: a patchwork of data
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Over time, the destinations of African migrants 
have become more diversified. In the early 1960s 
less than one in four of the estimated 8.1 million African 
migrants (23 %) lived outside of their native continent – 
most of them (1.3 million or 16%) were residents of the 
EU 28 Member States.26
By 2017, the share of African migrants heading 
overseas had more than doubled, acounting for 47% of 
the estimated 36.3 million African migrants. This also 
means that 53% of African migrants (19.4 million) 
today remain on the African continent.27 
The majority of those who leave head to Europe. 
In 2017, the EU 28 was hosting 9.1 million African-
born immigrants,28 of which, 5.1 million from Northern 
Africa and 4 million from Sub-Saharan Africa. Asia is 
the second most important overseas destination, 
hosting 4.4 million African migrants. The vast majority 
of these are temporary workers from Egypt and Eastern 
Africa living in the Gulf States and in Jordan with very 
limited rights.
Despite its considerable Afro-American population,29 
North America is not a prime destination for African 
migrants. The US and Canada are home and host to just 
2.6 million people born in Africa.
North African migrants are much more likely to 
head overseas  than other African migrants. In 
fact, the share of North African migrants living overseas 
(in relation to all emigrants) has remained above 90 % 
since the 1970s already (Figure 3). 
While figures are much lower in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
a gradual diversification is clearly taking place. 
Between 1960 and 2010 the share of Sub-Saharan 
migrants residing outside Africa rose from 3% to 34%. 
Between 2010 and 2017, the share stabilised at around 
30 % (Figure 3). Among people born in Southern Africa 
the share rose from 7% in 1960 to 41% in 2005, but 
then dropped to 35 % (2017), namely following the 
end of apartheid. Since the late 1990s, moving to 
the Republic of South Africa has become a regional 
alternative to overseas destinations.
More than half of all African migrants live in other African countries
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FIGURE 2. MORE AFRICANS ARE LIVING ABROAD THAN EVER 
BEFORE: WHERE DO THEY LIVE? 
Africans living outside their country of birth (stock data) by 
continent, 1960-2017, absolute numbers, in millions.
Source: World Bank for the period 1960-1980 and UN Population 
Division for the period 1990-2017; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on 
Migration and Demography (KCMD).
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FIGURE 3. A GROWING NUMBER OF AFRICANS IS LIVING 
OVERSEAS: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA CATCHING UP 
African migrants living outside Africa compared to total migrant 
population by region of origin, 1960-2017, in percentage. 
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Looking in more detail across the main sending and 
receiving countries one can see some distinct regional 
migration patterns (Figure 4).
• Just over one in four Africans living abroad 
in 2017 was from North Africa (9.2 million 
migrants) – the vast majority of which are 
overseas. Two different regional migration patterns 
can be identified: The first is made up of Maghreb-
to-Europe flows, with Algeria and Morocco as 
the main countries of origin, and migrants usually 
settling in Europe as permanent residents.30 This 
pattern can be explained by geographic proximity, 
previous labour recruitment agreements and post-
colonial ties.31 The second  consists of migrants 
from Egypt – the largest group of Africans living 
outside their country of birth in absolute numbers 
– most of whom head to the Gulf States and 
Jordan — usually as temporary workers. Mobility 
between North African countries is today 
rather the exception. Borders between Morocco 
and Algeria are closed, while Libya, until 2011 a 
major country of destination, no longer hosts large 
numbers of Arab migrants from Egypt and Tunisia.32
• Around 27% of African migrants are from 
Eastern Africa (9.8 million). Most of these live 
in another African country. Among them are 
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Note: the size of the pies represents the stock of emigrants in absolute numbers and the different colours 
represent the share by continent of destination. 
Source: UN Population Division; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD).
FIGURE 4. AFRICA’S MIGRANTS AND DIASPORAS 
Africans living abroad by continent of destination (stock data), 2017, absolute numbers, in millions.. 
considerable refugee populations that found 
protection in neighbouring countries; namely 
in Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan, South-Sudan and in 
Uganda (Box 2).33 Most of those countries which 
do not currently produce large-scale flows of 
internally displaced persons and refugees, such as 
Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, the Seychelles, Tanzania 
and Uganda, tend to have a sizeable diaspora 
living in Europe and North America. Eastern African 
labour migrants also move in large numbers to 
the Republic of South Africa and to Botswana, while 
geographic and partly cultural proximity make the 
Gulf States an important destination for temporary 
labour migrants from Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia. 
• Around a quarter of Africans living abroad 
were born in Western Africa (8.9 million). 
All countries of this region are members of the 
Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and, as such, their citizens have the right 
to enter, reside and establish economic activities 
in the territory of another Member State.34 
Strong networks among the many ethnic groups 
established in more than one country of the region 
also play an important role in facilitating and 
channelling migration flows.35 Two different patterns 
can be identified in this region. In more than half of 
Western African countries a majority of migrants 
MANY MORE TO COME?  MIGRATION FROM AND WITHIN AFRICA
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has moved within Africa, usually to another country. 
This intraregional migration within the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
region is mostly due to seasonal, temporary 
and permanent migrant workers primarily 
moving from countries such as Burkina Faso, 
Niger and Mali toward coastal and commodity-
richer countries such as Ghana, Ivory Coast and 
Nigeria.36 However, different migration patterns 
prevail in Cabo Verde, the Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria, 
Senegal and Sierra Leone. For these countries the 
number of diaspora members living in Europe 
and North America is larger than the number of 
emigrants living in Africa. As a result, Nigeria and 
Ivory Coast are not only among Africa’s most 
important migrant sending countries, but 
are also among the main receiving countries 
(Figures 4 and 6).
• The number of international migrants with 
Southern African origin is around 4.2 million. 
Most of them moved as temporary or permanent 
labour, but some also as refugees to the Republic 
of South Africa and in smaller numbers also 
to Botswana. Traditional sending countries are 
Malawi,  Mozambique, Lesotho, Zimbabwe and 
Swaziland. Three countries of Southern Africa show 
a different pattern: Madagascar and Mauritius with 
a diaspora mainly residing in Europe; and South 
Africa itself, which is a country of immigration, 
but also has Africa’s geographically most diverse 
emigration pattern, with its citizens (or former 
citizens) residing in Europe (in particular in the EU), 
North America and Australia (Figure 4). Many of 
them are not perceived to be ‘Africans’ because of 
the European origins of their ancestors.
• In 2017, some 4.1 million people born in 
Central Africa were living abroad, most of 
them in a neighbouring African country. Only in the 
case of Cameroon do around 46% of the emigrants 
live as diaspora members in Europe. Conflict and 
political instability have played an important 
role in migration both from and to neighbouring 
countries in Central Africa. Only Gabon hosts a 
larger number of migrant workers from the region.37
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On top of the 19.4 million African-born migrants and 
refugees living in Africa, the continent also hosts some 
2.3 million temporary or permanent immigrants from 
outside Africa, mostly from Asia and Europe.  
Just as the majority of African migrants are currently 
residing in Africa rather than overseas, many of these 
also remain, for the most part, within their regions of 
origin (Figure 5). Among these numbers, a large number 
are forced migrants. In 2016, there were some 5.3 
million registered international refugees in Africa 
mostly coming from neighbouring African countries 
(Box 2).38
• Northern Africa was home to 1.6 million 
foreign-born residents in 2017. Libya is both 
the most important receiving and transit country. 
In 2017, it hosted an estimated 800,000 foreign-
born residents and transit migrants. The majority 
of the more permanent immigrants are from 
the Middle East (Palestine, Iraq), while around 
400,00039 irregular African and Asian migrants 
transited through Libya to reach Italy during the 
years 2015-2017. The second most important 
receiving country is Egypt with almost 460,000 
foreign-born legal residents; the majority of them 
Palestinians, Syrians and citizens of other Middle 
Eastern countries. On top of that, Egypt hosts 
large numbers of undocumented including labour 
migrants from Sudan, as well as refugees from 
Eritrea, Somalia and Syria (Figure 5).
• The total number of migrants in East Africa 
was 6.9 million in 2017. Kenya (1 million), 
Ethiopia (1.1 million) and Uganda (1.6 million) 
host the largest numbers. The majority are 
refugees from South Sudan (1.3 million), Somalia 
(0.6 million) and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (0.4 million).40 In recent years the number 
of Chinese migrant workers, entrepreneurs,41 
government officials and military personnel moving 
to countries in the region has increased sharply.42
• In 2017, Western Africa hosted 6.1 million 
foreign-born residents – mostly labour migrants. 
Ivory Coast (2.1 million) and Nigeria (1.1 million) 
were the main destination countries. The largest 
immigrant community comes from Burkina Faso 
(1.3 million Burkinabe in Ivory Coast alone).
Africa hosts 21.7 million migrants and refugees
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Note: the size of the pies represents the stock of immigrants in absolute numbers and the different colours 
represent the share by African region of origin.
Source: UN Population Division; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD).
FIGURE 5. MIGRATION TOWARDS AND WITHIN AFRICA  
Foreign-born population in Africa (stock data), 2017, absolute numbers, in millions.
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• In Central Africa (3.1 million foreign-born in 
2017), the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(0.8 million), Cameroon (0.5 million) and Angola 
(0.5 million) were the most important destination 
countries, hosting for the most part refugees 
from the Central African Republic, Sudan, Rwanda, 
Nigeria and South Sudan. The main destination for 
labour migrants was Gabon (0.3 million).
• Southern Africa, which hosted 4.0 million 
foreign-born residents in 2017, is home to 
the African country with the largest number 
of foreign residents: the Republic of South 
Africa. The country has seen a considerable rise in 
immigration, becoming an attractive alternative to 
Europe and other overseas destinations. In 2010, 
the country was home and host to 1.9 million 
migrants. In 2017, the number had risen to 2.9 
million, making it Africa’s most important magnet 
society (Figure 5). Immigrants have origins ranging 
from Central, Eastern and Southern African to 
European, South Asian and Chinese. People born in 
Zimbabwe and Mozambique are the largest groups 
of immigrants. Many African immigrants have 
found work in key sectors such as mining43 while 
others work in the hospitality sector.
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Note: 'immigrant' refers to foreign-born migrants residing in the listed 
country. 'Emigrant' refers to people born in the listed country currently 
residing outside their country of birth. Showing the top 15 African 
countries of destination and origin. 
Source: UN Population Division, International Organisation for Migration; 
visualisation: Knowledge Centre on Migration and Demography (KCMD).
FIGURE 6. MIGRATION ON BALANCE – AFRICA’S MAIN COUNTRIES 
OF ORIGIN AND DESTINATION 
Stock of immigrants and emigrants for selected African countries, 2017. 
BOX 2 – International refugees and internally displaced persons in and from Africa
In 2016, Africa hosted a total of 5.3 million refugees from 
other African countries. Most of them found protection in Uganda,44 
Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Figure 7). 
Another 0.9 million Africans lived as refugees or asylum-
seekers in Europe and North America. The most important non-
African host countries were Yemen (260,000), Italy (80,000), France 
(70,000), and the United States (50,000). African refugees are mainly 
citizens of South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, the Central African Republic and Eritrea.
Next to this, another 12.6 million Africans were internally 
displaced45 within their own countries in 2016, as a result of 
political violence and civil wars. The country with the largest violence-
related internally displaced population, according to the International 
Displacement Monitoring Centre, was Sudan, followed by the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, South Sudan and Somalia. They all had 
between 1.1 million and 3.3 million internally displaced citizens living 
on their territory. In the course of 2016, some 2.8 million Africans were 
newly uprooted (flow of internally displaced persons) due to political 
violence and civil wars. Historical data on the stock of people internally 
displaced by geophysical events and extreme weather conditions are not 
available, but in 2016 alone 1.1 million Africans were newly uprooted as 
a result of these factors.
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Note: the figure shows the top African countries based on the stock of 
international refugees and internally displaced persons. 
Source: United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 
and International Displacement Monitoring Centre, International 
Organisation for Migration; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on 
Migration and Demography (KCMD).
FIGURE 7. FORCED MIGRATION ON BALANCE IN AFRICA’S MAIN 
REFUGEE-PRODUCING AND REFUGEE-RECEIVING COUNTRIES   
Stock of refugees, stock of IDPs, 2016, absolute numbers, in millions.
South Africa is not the only net receiving country on the 
continent. A few other African countries also have more 
foreign-born people residing on their territory than 
native-born emigrants living abroad. Among them, in 
2017, were Ivory Coast, Ethiopia and Uganda (Figure 4).
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Less legal and more irregular migration from Africa to Europe
Between 2010 and 2015, some 1.3 million Africans 
migrated to another country each year, on average. 
Among these, some 400,000 to 500,000 have been 
moving to Europe each year (Figure 8). 
Until 2012, the vast majority of these travelled as 
regular immigrants with visa and residence permits 
granted before arrival. However, the number of 
African immigrants settling legally in EU Member 
States dropped significantly, from 442,000 in 2008 
to 270,000 in 2012. Since then, numbers have remained 
more or less stable, with 288,000 legal arrivals in 2016 
(Figure 8).46
Among these recent (2008-2016) regular immigrants 
to Europe, almost 57% were Northern African citizens 
– although the flow of regular North African migrants 
fell by 40%, from 253,000 in 2008 to 152,000 in 2016. 
Over this period, the already small number of residence 
permits issued to Libyans dropped by 72%, while those 
issued to Moroccans and Egyptians dropped by 52% and 
15% respectively. During this period Morocco was and 
remained the most important source country, followed 
by Algeria (Figure 9). 
The remaining 43% of legal African immigrants to 
Europe over the period 2008 to 2016 came from Sub-
Saharan countries. Legal immigration from this region 
fell by 31% from 190,000 in 2008 to 130,000 in 2012, 
and remained more or less stable until 2016 (138,000). 
Nigerians were the most important group followed by 
Senegalese and South Africans (Figure 9).
Family formation and family reunion remain the 
main legal gates of entry for Africans migrating 
to and staying in Europe, even if its nature is 
changing. During the period 2008-2016, some 167,000 
to 182,000 first residence permits were issued each 
year to newly married or dependent family members 
(Figure 10). Unlike in the 1970s and 1980s, when family 
reunion consisted of labour migrants being joined by 
their spouses and minor children, today this type of 
legal migration is mainly linked to well-established 
Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian diasporas in Europe, 
namely in France, the UK, Italy, Spain, Belgium and 
the Netherlands. It is the children and grandchildren 
of immigrants who are getting married to distant 
relatives and members of local communities living in 
their ancestral land. In many cases these marriages 
are arranged by relatives, and the subsequent family 
reunion almost always takes place in Europe.47 
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
T
h
o
u
s
a
n
d
Africa	total
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
Sub-Saharan	Africa
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
2
0
1
1
2
0
1
2
2
0
1
3
2
0
1
4
2
0
1
5
2
0
1
6
Northern	Africa
Non-humanitarian	ﬁrst	residence	permits
Asylum	seekers
Note: the figure only includes first residence permits with a duration 
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people receiving this status are included in the number of asylum-
seekers.   
Source: Eurostat; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on Migration and 
Demography (KCMD).
FIGURE 8. AFRICA-EU: LEGAL MIGRATION DROPS, IRREGULAR 
MIGRATION INCREASES 
Annual flows of African citizens to the EU-28 based on first 
residence permits and asylum applications, 2008-2016, absolute 
numbers, in thousands.
Contrary to permits awarded for family  reunion, which 
remained more or less stable over the period 2008-
2016, first residence permits awarded for work 
reasons fell by almost 70%, down from 83,000 in 
2008 to 26,000 in 2016 (Figure 10).48 
In counterpart, irregular arrivals of Africans across 
the Mediterranean have increased considerably in 
recent years, with arrivals culminating in Italy, Spain 
and Greece during the years 2014-2016. 
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Note: the figure only includes first residence permits with a duration 
equal or longer than 12 months issued by the EU-28 for non-
humanitarian reasons. It does not include residence permits for 
humanitarian reasons as most of the people receiving this status are 
included in the number of asylum seekers.
Source: Eurostat; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on Migration and 
Demography (KCMD).
FIGURE 9. REGULAR IMMIGRATION OF AFRICANS DOWN UNTIL 
2012 AND STABLE SINCE 
First residence permits issued by the EU-28 to African citizens by 
citizenship, 2008-2016, top 10 countries of origin listed, absolute 
numbers, in thousands.
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The destabilisation of Libya, combined with the rise in 
human smuggling activities and the  increase in search 
and rescue operations carried out by European NGOs, 
coast guards and naval forces, played a significant role 
in generating and facilitating this flow.49
As a result, asylum and humanitarian protection 
entry channels saw much greater demand. Between 
2008 and 2012, first-time asylum claims by Africans 
in the EU-28 averaged at around 75,000 each year. 
Since 2013, with more and more migrants crossing 
the Central and Western Mediterranean, the number of 
asylum claims rose drastically – peaking at 212,600 in 
2016 (Figure 11),50  although it fell to 140,000 in 2017. 
The increase is linked both to higher numbers of irregular 
arrivals per se, as well as to an intensification of controls 
at points of disembarkation in Sicily and Calabria, which 
gave more visibility to irregular entries.51 Since 2015-
2016, most irregular migrants are registered upon 
arrival and almost all of them now ask for asylum in 
Italy, as crossing to North-Western Europe has become 
more difficult for them.
With the reinforced control efforts in Libya, irregular 
arrivals at Italy’s southern shores dropped in 2017, but 
passages from Algeria and Morocco to Spain as well as 
from Algeria and Tunisia to Italy went up. In the case of 
Spain irregular entry to the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta 
and Melilla (located on the African continent) also play 
a role.52 Overall though, asylum claims by Africans to 
the EU became a bit less frequent in 2017 compared to 
2015 and 2016, and the drop continued in early 2018.53
The large majority of irregular arrivals were citizens of 
Sub-Saharan countries.54 Among these, two different 
groups can be identified:
• Eritreans and Somalis, who have a considerable 
chance of being granted refugee status;55
• Citizens of other African countries, who only have 
a relatively small chance of being recognised as 
refugees. Claiming asylum, however, gives them 
access to temporary status, along with some social 
transfers, housing, healthcare and education. In this 
second group, the majority of asylum-seekers are 
from Sub-Saharan Africa with Nigeria, Ivory Coast, 
and Senegal being the most important countries of 
origin. A minority hail from the Maghreb; at first 
mainly from Morocco and Algeria, but more recently 
also from Tunisia.56  In most cases, the asylum 
claims of the second group are rejected, but the 
migrants remain in Europe under a different status. 
The majority of irregular African migrants who 
were denied refugee status also remain in the EU 
— as most countries of origin are only reluctantly 
cooperating with EU Member State authorities in 
the return and readmission of their citizens.57
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FIGURE 11. ASYLUM CLAIMS OF AFRICANS ON THE RISE SINCE 2012 
First asylum applications in the EU-28, by countries of origin 2008-
2016, absolute numbers, in thousands, top 10 countries of origin listed.
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FIGURE 10. REGULAR IMMIGRATION FROM AFRICA: FAMILY REUNION 
DOMINANT, LABOUR MIGRATION DOWN, STUDENT MIGRATION SMALL 
First residence permits issued by the EU28 countries to African 
citizens by ’gates of entry’, 2010-2016, absolute numbers, in 
thousands.
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Individual intentions: the gap between wish and reality
Personal aspirations play an important role in decisions 
to remain in one’s place of birth or to move – within the 
country of origin or abroad – although there is often 
a gap between a person’s wishes and their concrete 
actions (Figure 12).
• During the period 2010-2015, 24% to 30% of 
Africans aged 15 or over declared a general wish 
to move to another country for an extended period 
or permanently. 
• Over the same period, some 4% to 7% of Africa’s 
population (age 15 and older) planned to move 
within a 12-month timeframe.
• 1% actually took concrete steps to prepare for that 
move.
• On average, only 0.12 % of Africa’s total population 
(some 1.3 million people) actually emigrated 
each year over that period.58 On an annual basis 
this represents less than one in 200 people who 
indicated a general wish of moving to another 
country.59 
The global Gallup survey, which provides this analysis 
(Box 3) shows that the profile of Africans with no 
intention of moving abroad differs from the profile of 
those expressing a general intention to migrate, and 
from those who plan and prepare moving to another 
country (Figure 13).
On average, people who take concrete steps to leave 
their country of birth are in their 20s, and generally 
better educated and economically in a better position 
than those who merely express a desire to migrate, or 
those who do not even consider leaving their country. 
More than half of those who prepare their departure 
have completed secondary or tertiary education.
In contrast to public perception, more than one in two 
Africans (54%) who take concrete steps to migrate 
have a job. 16% are unemployed jobseekers, while 30% 
are economically inactive.
As a result, Africans, who are actually prepared to move 
have, on average, a higher income than those who want to 
remain or who are only considering leaving their country. 
Access to cash makes it more likely that people can 
afford to pay for travel documents, for the journey and 
– if necessary – for facilitators and smugglers along the 
way. Higher qualifications and previous work experience 
also contribute to emigration as the chances of finding 
work and earning money abroad increase (Figure 13).
Wish Plan Preparation Actual	migration
rate
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30%
Note: the wish, plan and preparation are calculated on the basis of the 
Gallup surveys (2010-2015 waves) for age 15 and above. The actual 
emigration rate is calculated as the ratio between annual emigration 
flows and the total African population.
Source: Gallup; visualisation: Knowledge Centre on Migration and 
Demography (KCMD).
FIGURE 12. MIGRATION FROM AND WITHIN AFRICA: WISH AND REALITY 
Migration intentions, plans and preparations of Africans (age 15+) 
as a percentage of the surveyed population (15+) and actual annual 
emigration rate as a percentage of the total population (average 
2010-2015).
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The Gallup World Poll is a public opinion survey covering more than 
150 countries worldwide.62 For each of the countries, Gallup surveys 
approximately 1,000 individuals, who are representative of the country’s 
population aged 15 and older.
The Gallup annual surveys from 2010 to 2015 explored potential 
migration.63 More specifically, individual intentions to move abroad, along 
with the different stages of the possible migration decision, are captured 
through the following questions:
• Migration wish: ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like 
to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer to 
continue living in this country?
• Migration plan: are you planning to move permanently to another 
country in the next 12 months?
• Migration preparation: have you done any preparation for this 
move?
As such, the survey contributes to a better understanding of the different 
drivers of migration wishes and of real actions.
BOX 3 - From wish to reality: The Gallup World Poll Survey
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FIGURE 13. WHO WANTS TO MOVE ABROAD?
Selected characteristics of African adults with the intention, plan and 
preparation moving abroad, 2010-2015
When looking at intentions to migrate by gender for 
the period 2010-2015, men (age group 15+) were 
overrepresented among the minority of people who 
prepared for the move. In the end, more men than 
women move as economic migrants within Africa. The 
large majority of irregular migrants and asylum-seekers 
arriving in Italy and Spain are also men.60 By contrast, 
women have a slightly higher chance of migrating 
legally to Europe for family-related reasons.61
Prior migration experience also increases the likelihood 
of planning and taking concrete steps to move abroad. 
Around 8% of those who take concrete steps are 
foreign-born, compared to 3% of those who just intend 
to migrate, which is the African average.
19
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Macro drivers of African migration: diaspora, income differentials, 
urbanisation and development
In addition to people’s individual aspirations and 
characteristics, many other factors linked both to the 
country of origin and to the country of destination can 
come into play – often at the same time – in defining 
migration corridors between countries. So-called ‘gravity 
models’ of migration can help to identify drivers (Box 4, 
Figure 14).
• In the case of African migration, diasporas in 
receiving countries play a crucial role in shaping 
ongoing migratory flows – more so than in other 
world regions. This is particularly evident in the 
case of family reunion, where – mostly male, but 
sometimes femal too – diaspora members who are 
living in Europe or North America get married64 to 
people from their regions of origin and/or distant 
relatives of their parents or grandparents. Within 
Africa and in the Gulf States, diaspora members 
and co-ethnic locals are active in identifying job 
opportunities for prospective economic migrants. As 
a result, the size of diasporas in receiving countries 
is a good indicator of the destinations that citizens 
of particular African countries are likely to migrate 
to. The larger the diaspora in a particular destination 
country, the more migration takes place to this 
country (positive effect; Figure 14).
• Trade volumes are a clear indication of existing 
links between countries. It is therefore no surprise 
that the scale of commercial exchanges between 
countries correlates with migration flows, although 
this is less apparent within Africa than between 
Africa and Europe or Asia. This has to do with the 
fact that bilateral trade volumes are much smaller 
within Africa than, for example, between Africa and 
the EU.65
• Income differentials between countries can also 
motivate people seeking better opportunities to 
move abroad in the hope of settling in a country 
with a higher GDP per capita. This is particularly 
evident in the case of migration from Africa to 
destinations abroad in Europe, Western Asia and 
North America, but it does not play any statistically 
significant role in the case of migration within 
Africa. This is largely due to the relatively small 
differences in GDP per capita between neighbouring 
countries in Africa. It also reflects the fact that a 
large share of migration flows within Africa are 
forced migration flows, determined by conflicts, 
poverty and instability in countries of origin, and 
by people looking for protection, rather than by 
economic conditions in destination countries.
• The negative effect that GDP per capita in the 
country of origin has on migration within and 
outside Africa indicates that lower levels of GDP 
can push people to migrate. However, this effect 
is less strong for migration outside Africa since 
poverty and a lack of access to cash may represent 
limiting factors for international mobility. On the one 
hand, higher development can reduce incentives 
to migrate, but on the other hand, it could enable 
more people to migrate outside of Africa by easing 
the poverty trap. These findings of the ‘gravity 
model’ are in line with results from the Gallup 
surveys of 2010-2015, which show that educated 
and economically active people with access to cash 
are overrepresented among those who actively 
prepare for emigration (Figure 13). As for the 
general model of migration for all countries in the 
world, the 'push' effect of low GDP per capita is not 
statistically significant. This can be explained by the 
non-linear relation between GDP and emigration 
rates, and the fact that three different patterns 
are bundled together:66 In low-income countries, 
a growing GDP corresponds to more emigration 
as more people acquire the means to migrate 
(positive effect); in middle-income countries, the 
effect is null; in high-income countries, a higher 
GDP corresponds with less migration as people, 
on average, are less inclined to emigrate (negative 
effect). This supports the migration transition (or 
‘hump’) theory – according to which migration first 
rises with economic development, up to a GDP per 
capita threshold of roughly of  7,000 to 13,000 
international dollars per year, after which the 
relationship is reversed and people are more likely 
to stay in their home countries (Box 5). 
• Rapid population growth also goes hand in hand 
with lower emigration (negative effect). One reason 
for this might be that African countries with the 
highest population growth are also the poorest, 
and poverty limits the mobility of citizens. At the 
same time a higher number of children among 
the population might also hinder migration. This is 
particularly true for those who intend to migrate to 
non-African destinations.67
• Contrary to expectations, a higher share of 
young age groups in the population does not 
represent a significant  push factor for African 
emigration – neither inside the continent nor to 
external destinations. This is surprising as those 
aged 15-30 years tend to be the most mobile and 
the vast majority of Sub-Saharan African countries 
are at a stage of demographic transition in which 
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FIGURE 14. WHAT DRIVES MIGRATION WITHIN AND FROM AFRICA? 
Relevance of selected drivers of migration for bilateral migration intensities within Africa, outside 
Africa and around the world
Regression models for migration – also called ‘gravity models’ – have been 
used by several authors to understand the relevance of drivers in general,69 
although none of these models was developed specifically for Africa.
Three models can be applied to measure the relevance of economic, 
demographic and geographical variables in explaining migration 
intensities: (a) between countries in Africa, (b) between countries in Africa 
and countries outside Africa and (c) between all countries in the world.
The dependent variable in these models is the bilateral migration flow 
between specific countries of origin and destination as a share of the 
population in the country of origin calculated every 5 years in the period 
between 1960 and 2015.
The explanatory variables that represent migration drivers are:
• Diaspora, i.e. the stock of emigrants in the previous interval of 5 
years between a country of origin and a country of destination;
• Trade, i.e. the value of imports and exports between the country of 
origin and the country of destination as a share of gross domestic 
product (GDP) of the country of origin;
• Income differential, i.e. the difference in the GDP per capita between 
a country of destination and a country of origin;
• GDP per capita in the country of origin;
• Population growth in the country of origin;
• The share of population aged 20-24 in the country of origin;
• The share of urban population in the country of origin;
• The geographical distance between the country of origin and the 
country of destination.
The yearly data for the independent variables were averaged over each 
5-year period and analysed in order to be aligned with migration flow data.
To get comparable coefficients, both the dependent and the independent 
variables were expressed in logarithmic scale and standardised by 
subtracting the mean and then dividing it by the standard deviation.
The coefficient values represent the effect of the specific independent 
variable on migration flows. More formally, the coefficients indicate the 
change in standard deviations of dependent variables, per standard 
deviation increase in the independent variable.
BOX 4: What drives migration? Using gravity models to understand drivers of migration
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almost half the population is below the age of 20.68 
While the absolute number of youth and young 
adults matters for migration in absolute terms, the 
share with respect to the total population size does 
not produce a significant effect on the emigration 
rates.
• In Africa, unlike in the general model for all 
countries of the world, urbanisation seems to act 
as a key driver of migration. African countries which 
are already at advanced stages of urbanisation 
tend both to be richer and to send more migrants 
abroad. This is particularly true for Northern Africa. 
Some of those who move from the countryside to 
bigger cities also seem to be more likely to move 
on to another country. In contrast, when looking 
at all migration corridors globally, the degree of 
urbanisation in countries of origin has no positive 
effect on migration flows.
• Within Africa, a higher geographic distance 
between two countries reduces the likelihood of 
migration (negative effect).70 Africans tend to move 
to neighbouring countries rather than to distant 
African countries. This is true both for economic 
migrants and for forced migrants and refugees. As 
for non-African destinations, geographic proximity is 
not a central issue (the model even shows a positive 
effect of distance). This mainly reflects the migration 
preferences of Africans leaving their continent; the 
majority of which move to destinations in Europe, 
the Gulf States and North America.
The results of the gravity model thus clearly show that 
high population growth, a higher share of young people 
and a low degree of urbanisation in a given African 
country go hand in hand with lower emigration from 
that country (negative effect on emigration rates). 
By contrast, there is more emigration from countries 
with lower population growth and a higher share of 
urban population. As regards migration outside of 
Africa, the push effect of low income on emigration 
is less evident, reflecting the fact that the majority 
of Sub-Saharan African countries are still in an early 
stage of socioeconomic development, which mostly 
favours migration to neighbouring countries rather 
than international migration given the lack of financial 
resources available to potential migrants.
Both the results of the Gallup survey and of the 
‘gravity model’ make one thing clear: socioeconomic 
development, better education, job creation and 
improved income opportunities for Africans will not 
make them less mobile, but – at least in the short to 
medium-term – more mobile. It will take a long time 
before the majority of African countries reach the 
tipping point of a GDP per capita ranging between 
7,000 to 13,000 international dollars per year above 
which emigration becomes less likely. Today only 11 of 
the 53 African countries have a GDP per capita above 
this threshold,71 and at least three of these are still 
emigration countries.72
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A number of key determinants will most likely affect 
African migration over the coming decades. Among 
these are:
• demography;
• socio-economic development;
• climate change;
• political instability, violence and geopolitical factors.
Forecasting future migration flows based on these 
determinants is more difficult than projecting total 
population (Box 6).73 Possible interactions between 
some of these key determinants can, however, be 
described in the form of scenarios.
The determinant that we know best is demographic 
change. During the past 50 years the demographic 
transition in Africa has been slower than in other less 
developed parts of the world. While infant mortality 
has significantly decreased, many Sub-Saharan African 
countries report only slowly diminishing numbers of 
children per woman (total fertility). As a result, Africa 
has and will continue to experience very high population 
growth for several decades to come. The most recent 
UN World Population Prospects projection (medium 
scenario)74 estimates that Africa’s total population 
will double from 1.2 billion inhabitants in 2017 to 2.5 
billion by 2050 – with most of the increase deriving 
from Western, Central and Eastern Africa (Figure 15).75 
Besides the overall increase in total population, Sub-
Saharan African countries are seeing a transformation 
of their age structure from a pyramid shape (with the 
largest cohorts in the youngest age groups) to a more 
equal distribution in all groups below the ages of 35-40. 
This transition is already evident in some countries of 
Northern and Southern Africa where the age group 20-
35 – the prime age at which Africans are most mobile 
– is already the largest. For many countries of Western, 
Central and Eastern Africa, this change will only happen 
in a more distant future (Figure 15). As a result, the 
number of migrants can be expected to increase over 
the next 20-30 years under any plausible scenario.
As for socio-economic development projections, 
an optimistic approach would assume that Africa will 
be home to a more rapid development triggered by 
domestic and foreign investment, coupled with better 
and more widespread education and a larger reduction 
in the average number of children (lower fertility). 
Based on such assumptions, a population projection 
variant (Shared Socioeconomic Pathways - SSP1) has 
been calculated by the International Institute for Applied 
Scenarios for the 21st century: how demography, development and 
climate change will shape migration within and from Africa 
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FIGURE 15. AFRICA’S POPULATION WILL MOST LIKELY DOUBLE BY 2050 
Evolution of the population in Northern and Sub Saharan Africa and age pyramids according to UN 
Population Division projections (World Population Prospects (WPP) 2017 medium scenario), absolute 
numbers, in millions.
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The neoclassical theory of migration76 postulates that migration at the 
macro-level is mainly determined by differences in income levels between 
countries of origin and of destination: the larger the difference is, the 
more likely it is that people migrate from countries with a lower income 
to countries with a higher income. Over time, economic development 
should reduce income differences between countries and lead to less 
emigration from countries with lower wages.
The mobility transition theory77 contrasts with the neo-classical approach 
by advancing that migration flows do not necessarily take place 
between countries with the highest income differentials, but are rather 
determined by stages of development and mobility. According to this 
theory, the poverty, widespread subsistence farming and slow economic 
development in many African countries represent a poverty trap which 
hinders international movements between African countries, as well as 
from Africa to Europe and other destinations, despite strong potential 
incentives to migrate due to high income differentials. At the same time, 
economic development – in particular in Sub-Saharan African countries 
– can trigger more migration as people acquire both the financial means 
and the human capital to successfully leave their countries in search of 
better opportunities abroad.
Available data underpins the plausibility of the mobility transition theory 
– also termed the 'hump hypothesis'. 
Comparisons between Africa and other parts of the world show that 
emigration increases with economic development, up to a GDP per 
capita threshold of roughly 7,000 to 13,000 international dollars per 
year (measured in purchasing power parity (PPP) at constant 2011 
international dollars). At this tipping point, emigration peaks and 
recedes with higher GDP per capita levels (Figure 16), while immigration 
becomes relatively more important. Today, only a few African countries 
have a GDP per capita above this threshold. Among them figure Algeria, 
Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Namibia, 
the Seychelles, the Republic of South Africa, Swaziland and Tunisia. 
Available data also show that, excluding refugees, the majority of 
African migrants do not come from the poorest countries. Today, by 
African standards the relatively richer Maghreb countries and Egypt are 
responsible for almost 50% of total migration. As most African citizens 
live in countries with a GDP per capita that is well below the threshold of 
7,000 to 13,000 international dollars per year, their propensity to migrate 
is likely to increase with economic development in the years to come. 
Under the optimistic assumptions of a sustained economic growth, most 
Eastern and Western African countries will reach a level of GDP which is 
corresponding to the peak in migration rates only after 2050 (Figure 17).
BOX 5: Peak migration? The theories of migration and development
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band shows the range of GDP per capita which according to the 
mobility transition theory is associated with a peak in emigration 
rates.79 
Source: World Bank; visualisation: KCMD
FIGURE 17. COUNTRIES IN EASTERN AND WESTERN AFRICA WILL 
NEED MANY MORE YEARS TO REACH A PEAK IN EMIGRATION RATES
Projected GDP per capita for 2015-2050 in African regions assuming 
an increase of 1% in annual growth rates compared to 2010-2015.
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Note: the curve results from a non-parametric estimate of the relation 
between GDP per capita and emigration rates on the basis of 2015 
data for all countries in the world.78 
The shaded grey area represents the 7,000 to 13,000 threshold in 
2011 international dollars.
Source: UN Population Division and World Bank; visualisation: KCMD
FIGURE 16. EMIGRATION IS INCREASING WITH DEVELOPMENT 
UNTIL A LEVEL OF AROUND 7,000 – 13,000 INTERNATIONAL 
DOLLARS OF GDP PER CAPITA
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Systems Analysis (IIASA).80 It projects that Africa’s total 
population would only increase to 1.8 billion in 2050 
and would stabilise by 2080. Such a development path 
would be in line with projections for the EU's External 
Investment Plan which aims to channel more private 
investments into African infrastructure, create jobs and 
address the so-called 'root causes' of migration.81
By combining different assumptions about both the 
speed of socio-economic development (in line with 
current trends versus more rapid development) and 
the rate of population growth (higher versus lower 
population growth), two main scenarios have been 
developed to project future migration rates from and 
within Africa (Table 1).82 A third scenario looks into 
the more destabilising and unpredictable impact that 
climate change can have on parts of Africa and on 
subsequent migratory flows.
Scenario 1 is based on a continuation of current 
trends, be it in terms of socio-economic development, 
population growth, or migration intensity. Migratory flows 
would remain above the world average in Northern Africa 
and below the global average in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
At constant migration rates, it is principally the increase 
in the number of younger African citizens (aged 15-
35) – mainly in in Western, Central and Eastern Africa 
– that will lead to an increase in the absolute number 
of migrants within and from Africa. The future number 
of African migrants can be estimated by applying each 
country's specific emigration rate from 2015 to the 
future size of its age group 15-35 (using the UN's 2017 
World Population Prospects medium variant). 
Under this scenario, the annual number of mobile 
Africans leaving their country of origin would 
increase from 1.4 million in 2015 to 2.8 million in 
2050 (Figure 18). 
Continuation of current 
socio-economic 
development trends
Current (2015) emigration rates 
remain constant
Higher population growth, 
in line with current trends 
(UN projections)
SCENARIO 1
More rapid socio-economic 
development
Emigration rates rise as Africa’s 
low-income countries converge 
towards the median emigration rate 
of Africa’s middle-income countries
Lower population growth as a result 
of faster socio-economic 
development (Shared 
Socio-economic Pathways projection)
SCENARIO 2
Socio-economic development 
disrupted in several African 
countries due to climate change
Displacement and emigration 
rise with desertiﬁcation, water 
scarcity and a rise in unrest and 
political violence
Higher population growth, 
in line with current trends 
(UN projections)
SCENARIO 3
TABLE1. THREE SCENARIOS OF FUTURE SOCIO-ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC AND MIGRATORY DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA
Scenario 2 assumes that economic growth triggered 
by more direct investment will lead to the creation 
of wage-bearing jobs in the formal economy and to 
subsequent socio-economic transformations, including 
access to better education and a faster decline in 
fertility rates that will eventually lead to a reduction 
of the number of people in the most mobile 15-35 age 
group.
At the same time, higher levels of socio-economic 
development will enable more Africans to access 
education, jobs and cash incomes, thereby also 
increasing the pool of people who have both the 
financial means to migrate and a level of human capital 
potentially providing access to better-paid jobs abroad. 
Increased investments in infrastructures will mean 
African countries are better connected with each other 
and with the rest of the world, reducing some of the 
existing barriers to geographic mobility. 
Note: For the merits and limitation of such scenarios see Box 6
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Based on these projections, Scenario 2 assumes that 
emigration rates in Africa’s low-income countries will 
gradually rise to the current average migration levels 
of Africa’s middle-income countries, while the latter will 
stay the same. 
In this scenario there are thus two opposite forces: on the 
one side, demography has a smaller effect on emigration 
(compared to scenario 1) as population growth slows; 
on the other, socio-economic development more than 
compensates for this lower demographic effect by 
enabling more international mobility. The future number 
of African migrants can thus be estimated by applying 
the modified country-specific emigration rates to a less 
rapidly expanding pool of 15-35 year-olds (using the 
Shared Socioeconomic Pathways – SSP1 projection).  
Under this scenario, the combined effects of a smaller 
demographic expansion and of a convergence of African 
migration rates towards the higher values of middle-
income countries, would lead to an increase in the 
annual number of Africans leaving their country 
of origin from 1.4 million in 2015 to 3.5 million in 
2050 (Figure 18).
Scenario 3 assumes a destabilisation of parts 
of Africa induced by climate change. Particularly 
important impacts are expected to come from extended 
heat waves and higher surface temperatures, as well as 
disruptions in water cycles making droughts more common 
and human survival in affected regions more difficult – all 
the more so in currently populated arid regions like the 
Maghreb region, Egypt, Sudan, parts of Southern Africa 
and the Big Lakes region of Eastern Africa.83
Such developments could negatively affect some already 
fragile states, increasing existing tensions over land 
rights and scarce water resources (in particular between 
farmers and breeders), and triggering displacement 
and subsequent internal mobility from affected coasts 
and arid rural areas to urban areas. Such a scenario 
also implies higher food prices. All this could ultimately 
contribute to unrest and political violence, which would 
lead to additional displacement.
Many experts assume that climate change will result 
in higher mobility, but the relation between climate 
change and migration is indirect84 and will most likely 
pass through complex interactions of disruptive events, 
gradual degradation, poverty, urbanisation and political 
instability.
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FIGURE 18. THE FUTURE OF AFRICAN MIGRATION: MORE TO COME 
Simple simulation of the annual migration flows from Northern Africa, Sub Saharan Africa and 
Southern Africa according to scenarios one and two, absolute numbers, in millions.
Note: see box for details on the simulation.  
Source: Abel (2017) and UN Population Division; visualisation: KCMD
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Resilience to the negative impacts of climate change is 
small in many of Africa’s already vulnerable countries. 
As a result, internal displacement in such countries is 
likely to increase, but desertification as well as the loss 
of habitat in coastal regions could also lead to higher 
emigration.85 In more developed African countries, 
people with the means to migrate might anticipate the 
negative impact of climate change and decide to leave 
ahead of the unfolding impact.
By combining climate change projections with 
demographic projections, it is possible to calculate the 
number of persons that could be affected by extreme 
changes in climate and estimate in this way the potential 
population which may be forced to move (Figure 19). 
The duration of periods with high temperatures is 
expected to reach extreme levels (above 100 days) in 
particular in Central and Eastern Africa. Around 8%  of 
the projected population living in Africa in 2100 will be 
affected by such prolonged periods of heat (149 million 
people). These changes will hit people in countries such 
as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (40 million 
people: 27% of the population), Angola (25 million 
people: 61% of the population), Sudan (30 million 
people: 32% of the population), Rwanda (17 million 
people: 79% of the population) and Burundi (15 million 
people: 100% of the population) the hardest.
When considering the number of consecutive dry days, 
it is possible to foresee particularly extreme conditions 
(more than 20 days in addition to current levels) for 
around 13% of the projected African population in 
2100 (236 million people). The population affected is 
mostly concentrated in Egypt (88 million people: 91% 
of the population), Zambia (27 million people: 92% of 
the population), Morocco (23 million people: 98% of 
the population), Algeria (20 million people: 57% of the 
population) and Malawi (18 million people: 43% of the 
population).
Unlike in scenarios 1 and 2 it is hardly possible to 
quantify how many of those affected by climate 
change and extreme weather conditions will ultimately 
decide to migrate. To forecast such an effect it would 
be necessary to reconstruct the complex chain of 
interactions between climate change and the disruption 
of economic activities and take into account adaptation 
strategies. Some of these strategies could imply an 
increase in internal displacement and rural-to-urban 
mobility rather than in international migration to 
neighbouring countries and towards countries outside 
Africa. 
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FIGURE 19. CLIMATE CHANGE AFFECTS SOME PARTS OF AFRICA MORE THAN OTHERS 
Projected change in consecutive dry days and maximum heat wave length and affected population by 
the end of the century.
Note: the two bottom charts show the top 5 countries on the basis of total population affected by changes 
in the two analysed indicators.86  
Source: European Commission DG JRC
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The following conclusions can be drawn from these 
three scenarios:
• It is almost certain that emigration from African 
countries will increase in the coming decades, with 
many more Africans living outside their country of 
birth than there are today.
• Much of the increase will be derived from an 
interplay between demographic change and socio-
economic development.
• If social development and economic growth are low, 
the decline in fertility rates will remain slow and 
Africa’s population will grow more rapidly creating 
a larger demographic pool of migrants (Scenario 1). 
• If, however, development efforts bear fruit more rapidly 
and education and living conditions improve, the 
number of children per family will decline more quickly. 
This will lead to a smaller increase in the migration-
prone age group of 15-35 year-olds, but many more 
Africans will be empowered to become mobile and able 
to leave their countries of origin (Scenario 2).
• Climate change and extreme weather events are 
also likely to play a key role in driving international 
migration, as internal displacement 'spills over' into 
neighbouring countries, and as Africans who have 
the means to move to more distant countries in 
reaction to or to anticipate negative developments 
(Scenario 3).
Available data do not hint at an imminent mass exodus 
of Africans. However, these scenarios indicate that, in the 
medium term, socio-economic development, population 
growth and climate change will lead to more Africans 
on the move than today. Even at an accelerated speed 
of socio-economic development, African countries will 
experience more emigration than immigration during 
the next 30-40 years. More rapid development will 
reduce population growth, but increase the ability of 
young people to migrate.
The number of Africans that will migrate to other 
African countries and the number that will move to 
Europe, Asia and North America will not only depend 
on the preferences and needs of Africa’s potential 
migrants. It will also depend on migration and return 
policies adopted by countries of origin, of transit and 
of destination. In any case, boosting education and 
promoting family planning, accelerating job creation 
and mitigating climate change in Africa will be crucial 
to ensuring that people have a better future on their 
own continent.
Individual decisions to migrate depend on many factors at macro 
(country), meso (community, household) and micro (individual) level, 
a fact that makes forecasting migration at the aggregate level a 
highly complex task.87 Besides the intrinsic complexity of international 
migration and the lack of a unified theory of migration, limitations in 
producing acceptable estimates of future migration flows stem from five 
main issues:
• The basic data about emigration flows88 which are needed to fit 
a forecasting model are not available from official statistics at a 
global level and need to be estimated for a majority of country-to-
country corridors.89
• When available, these data show a high variability across countries 
and across time (in several cases without clear trends). This 
indicates that annual migration rates are as affected by contingent 
factors as they are influenced by structural country characteristics 
like GDP per capita, wage levels or unemployment rates.
• In the medium to longer term, it is difficult to anticipate the level of 
economic development in countries of origin and of destination. As 
a result, the direction of flows might change.
• The relation between development and the likelihood of migration 
could be changing. Despite strong empirical evidence supporting 
the migration transition theory (Box 5) it is difficult to foresee 
whether the current GDP per capita threshold of roughly 7,000-
13,000 international dollars per year at which emigration peaks 
will hold, or if it will move to a higher level.
• The translation of migration pressures into actual migration flows 
partly depends on economic, social and political factors including 
the demand for migrant labour, the acceptance of immigration and 
the admission and recruitment policies of receiving countries which 
can be anticipated, but are hard to predict accurately.
All of these limitations speak in favour of the application of scenarios. 
These scenarios are not predictions of the future, but serve as a basis 
for quantitative projections, which show what will happen under the 
conditions described in the scenario. As discussed, this can be done for 
scenarios 1 and 2, but not for scenario 3.
BOX 6: The limits of forecasting future migration flows
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Notes
1. Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey and the UK once controlled African territory. 
2. The only exception is Turkey that conquered large parts of Northern Africa (from Egypt to Algeria) already in the 16th century. 
3. Over the period of the Atlantic Slave Trade, from 1526 to its suppression in 1867, some 12.5 million had been enslaved and shipped 
from Africa, of which 10.7 million had arrived alive in in North America, the Caribbean and South America. Another 2 million   
Slaves were transported to Arab countries, partly across the Sahara to Northern Africa, partly along the Swahili coast to the Arab  
peninsula. Only 200.000 Africans were shipped to European destinations (in particular to mainland Portugal, the Azores, Madeira  
and the Canary Islands. Thomas, 2006). 
4. Namely Belgium, Germany, Italy, France, Portugal and Spain.
5. Today the only parts remaining under European control are the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Mellila (Spain), Réunion and Mayotte  
(France).
6. France conquered the Northern part of Algeria from Turkey. This occupation soon turned into colonisation, which brought people of  
French, Spanish, Italian and Maltese origins to the country (Kateb, 2001).
7. European migration to South Africa started in 1652 with the settlement of the Cape of Good Hope by the Dutch. Despite the   
preponderance of officials and colonists from the Netherlands, there were also a number of French Huguenots fleeing religious  
persecution at home and German sailors returning from service in Asia and remaining in South Africa.
8. Flahaux and De Haas, 2016. 
9. In particular: in Algeria, Angola, Kenya, Northern Morocco, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe.
10. MacMaster, 1997.
11. Most of those who did not move to Europe migrated to Israel (Kateb, 2001). This is also true for the Jewish community of Egypt. 
12. Between 1957 and 1962 Algeria was part of the European Communities.
13. David, 2015.
14. Laskier, 1994.
15. Poskanzer, 2000.
16. Among them were many former colonial settlers of European origins. Certain groups of European citizens born in Africa are, however, 
not included in the available data, e.g. French citizens who had to leave Algeria after independence in 1962.
17. Jolivel, 2014.
18. France (1964, 1968, 1971), Belgium (1970).
19. France, Spain, and Germany (1963), Belgium (1964), the Netherlands (1969).
20. Belgium (1969).
21. Estimate of the UN Population Division for 2017: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/
estimates17.shtml: see also International Organization for Migration, 2018.
22. This is slightly below the global share of people living outside their country: 3.3 % of world population in 2017. 
23. World Bank, http://databank.worldbank.org/data/databases/migration 
24. United Nations Population Division, https://esa.un.org/unmigration/
25. Abel, 2017. 
26. See footnote 16.
27. For shortcomings in the available and analysed date, see Box 1.
28. Many African colonial settlers of European origins who have moved to Europe between the 1960s and the 1990s as citizens of a  
European country are not included in this figure.
29. In 2010, the US Census counted 42 million so called ‘non-Hispanic blacks’ and multiracial African Americans. The large majority of  
them are descendants of enslaved Africans who were brought to the Americas between the start of the 16th century and the 1860s.
30. North Africa’s most common migration corridors are: Egypt–Saudi Arabia, Algeria–France, Morocco–France, Morocco-Spain.
31. Natter, 2014. 
32. http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Libya.pdf
33. From Somalia and Eritrea to Ethiopia and Kenya; from South Sudan to Sudan, Kenya and Uganda; from Burundi to Tanzania. In  
2017, the largest refugee populations were hosted by Uganda (1,250,000), Ethiopia (740,000), Kenya (490,000). 
34. http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/PROTOCOL%20RELATING%20TO%20%20FREE%20MOVE 
MENT%20OF%20PERSONS.pdf 
35. Flahaux and De Haas, 2016.
36. Devillard, Bacchi, and Noack, 2015.
37. Devillard, Bacchi, and Noack, 2015. 
38. This figure does not include internally displaced people (IDPs).
39. Arrivals through the Central Mediterranean route from African countries in 2015, 2016 and until December 2017 according to  
European Border and Coastal Guard Agency data.
40. The refugees’ data refers to 2016 and is based on UNHCR statistics on population of concern.
41. Djibuti hosts China’s first foreign military basis.
42. Cook, Lu, Tugendhat, and Alemu, 2016.
43. Nshimbi and Fioramonti, 2013. 
44. In 2017, the number of refugees in Uganda had risen to more than 1 250 000 mainly due to refugee flows from South Sudan. See  
http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/country.php?id=229
45. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2017.
46. First residence permits for the purpose of family reunion, work or education covering a period of more than 12 months are used as 
a proxy measuring legal immigration. 
47. Penn and Lambert, 2009. 
48. Family reunion is the main gate of entry for legal immigrants from Northern, Western and Central Africa, while labour permits  
have been decreasing over the analysed period. Migrants from Eastern Africa usually arrive as asylum seekers and the majority of  
residence permits is issued for humanitarian reasons. For immigrants from Southern Africa, who are mainly citizens of the Republic  
of South Africa, first residence permits are issued mostly for work purposes, but numbers have been declining since 2010. 
49. European Political Strategy Centre, 2017. 
50. Residence permits for humanitarian reasons issued to citizens from Eastern and Western Africa mirror these patterns.
51. In 2015 and early 2016 some North African asylum seekers also came via Turkey and the Aegean to Greece and usually moved on  
via the Western Balkans to North Western Europe. 
52. http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5226 
53. http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean/location/5205 
54. Irregular flows also included smaller numbers of citizens of Bangladesh, Syria and the Maghreb countries.
55. According to Eurostat data, the recognition rate of first-time asylum applications in 2016 was 93 % for Eritreans and 66 % for  
Somalis.
56. In 2016, the recognition rate of first time asylum applications was 22 % for Nigerians and Senegalese, 27 % for Ivoirians, but only,  
7 % for Moroccans, and 5 % for Algerians. These figures include political asylum as well as humanitarian protection. 
57. https://www.iom.int/news/working-group-return-and-reintegration-meets-discuss-migration-management-west-africa-0
58. Actual emigration is intended as flows and measured on the basis of Abel, 2017. See box 1 for the distinction between stock and  
flows and limitations in the estimation of flows within Africa.
59. A broad set of individual, structural and country-specific characteristics (such as risk aversion, financial constraints, political and  
economic conditions and migration policies in sending and receiving countries) may hinder the realisation of the wish to migrate.  
The gap does not only exist in Africa, but at a global level. In Latin America, for instance, 28% of the adult population would like to  
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move, while only 1% prepares for the migration. Similarly, in Europe, where the share of those wishing to migrate accounts for 21% of 
the adult population, again only 1% reported concrete steps to realise that intention. 
60. See, for instance, the composition by gender of arrivals from the Mediterranean: http://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean
61. Over the period 2010-2016, more than 54 % of residence permits for family reasons granted to African citizens is issued to women 
according to Eurostat data.
62. The survey covers the following African countries: Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad,   
Republic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Libya,  
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone,  
Somalia, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Several of these countries  
have missing values in specific years of the 2010-2015 time series.
63. Esipova, Ray, and Pugliese, 2011.
64. In many cases this is a choice not made by the bride and groom, but by other family members. 
65. A note of caution is needed to interpret both the role of trade and diaspora as causal factors for the annual migration flows. The  
strong coefficients may in fact just be indicative of associations since trade, current flows and the building up of a sizeable   
diaspora between country pairs may be interacting and derive from unobserved socio-economic, cultural and geographical linkages  
between countries.
66. This fact becomes evident when considering separate models for countries of origin grouped by levels of income. For brevity   
purposes these models are not included in this report. Further supporting empirical evidence of nonlinear relations between   
development and emigration rates can be found in De Haas, 2008; Dao, Docquier, Parsons, and Peri, 2018; Martin and Taylor,   
1996; Clemens, 2014.
67. It should also not be overlooked that migration has an impact on population growth by reducing total growth in sending countries  
and increasing population growth in receiving countries. 
68. The exceptions are the Botswana, Djibuti, the Maldives, Lesotho, Swasiland and the Republic of South Africa.
69. Beine and Parsons, 2015.  
70. (69) This is shown in most gravity models of migration.
71. Today only Algeria, Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, Egypt, Gabon, Libya, Mauritius, Namibia, the Seychelles, the Republic of South  
Africa, Swasiland and Tunisia have a GDP/capita above 7 000 dollars per year (international dollars, purchasing power parity: see  
IMF 2017: http://statisticstimes.com/economy/african-countries-by-gdp-per-capita.php)
72. Egypt, Swasiland and Tunisia.
73. Buettner and Muenz, 2018.
74. World Population Prospects (WPP) of the UN Population Division for 2017, https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Publications/Files/WPP2017_
KeyFindings.pdf
75. During the projected period (2015-2050), the population of Sub-Saharan African countries is forecast to increase at an even higher  
pace: by 123 % until 2050.
76. Todaro, 1969.
77. Zelinsky, 1971.
78. See Clemens, 2014 for similar estimates.  
79. Own calculations based on Clemens, 2017. 
80. Lutz et al., 2014.
81. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/factsheet-eip-20171120_en.pdf
82. These scenarios only simulate the overall emigration flows from the countries of origin and not where they will be directed.
83. European Commission, Joint Research Centre, 2017.
84. Beine and Parsons, 2015.. 
85. Hummel and Liehr, 2015.  
86. Climate change is represented by two indicators of heat waves and consecutive dry days at the end of the century (average of   
annual values in the period 2071-2100). A heat wave is the number of consecutive days with temperatures greater than the 90th  
percentile of current ones. Both indicators are calculated from a large ensemble of Regional Climate Models from the Coordinated  
Regional climate Downscaling EXperiment (CORDEX) (Dosio, 2017) and are based on a scenario of comparatively high greenhouse  
gas emissions (RCP8.5). These climate change indicators are combined with projected population disaggregated in a grid of with cells  
of around 50 by 50 km. Also this population data is projected to 2100 on the basis of the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways SSP1  
scenario (Murakami and Yamagata, 2016).  
87. Bijak, 2011.
88. Another limitation arises from the fact that most models are based on emigration rates not reconciled with the immigration rates  
of receiving countries (Buettner and Muenz, 2018).
89. This is done, for example, by the UN Population Division as a basis for their WPP.
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